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+---
+title: "Zig Reproduced Without Binaries"
+date: 2024-11-12T22:21:48+02:00
+slug: zig-reproduced-without-binaries
+draft: true
+---
+
+I decided to bootstrap zig without using binaries that are [checked in the
+repository](https://github.com/ziglang/zig/blob/0.13.0/stage1/zig1.wasm) and
+see if the resulting `zig1.wasm` in the latest zig release (0.13.0) is the same
+the one bootstrapped without those binaries.
+
+TLDR: `zig1.wasm` of the official 0.13.0 and our-hard-bootstrapped one are the
+same. Whoof, Zig is clean from [this famous attack vector][2], or at least
+there is nothing hiding in `zig1.wasm` that hasn't been in the checked-in
+sources:
+
+```
+$ sha256sum code/zig{,2}/stage1/zig1.wasm
+127909fb8c9610ce3f296d8a48014546c0f85055115002fb3aba4d865dcdbb27  code/zig/stage1/zig1.wasm
+127909fb8c9610ce3f296d8a48014546c0f85055115002fb3aba4d865dcdbb27  code/zig2/stage1/zig1.wasm
+```
+
+Many, many thanks to [Hilton Chain][1] for reasons I that will become clear
+later.
+
+# Official zig1.wasm
+
+Steps to acquire the official incarnation of `zig1.wasm` are straightforward:
+download zig, build `zig3` using the official instructions, use it to
+`update-zig1`:
+
+```
+git clone https://github.com/ziglang/zig; cd zig
+git checkout 0.13.0
+mkdir build; pushd build
+  cmake ..
+  make -j install
+popd
+build/stage3/bin/zig build update-zig1
+```
+
+Which results in an updated `code/zig/stage1/zig1.wasm`:
+
+```
+$ git diff --stat
+ stage1/zig1.wasm | Bin 2675178 -> 2800926 bytes
+ 1 file changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
+```
+
+We will be comparing this `zig1.wasm` to the one bootstrapped in the next
+section.
+
+# Binary-free zig1.wasm
+
+Builting zig 0.13.0 without binaries is tricky, because to build zig 0.13.0, we
+need a `zig1.wasm`, which has been checked in and continuously updated since
+[late 2022](https://github.com/ziglang/zig/pull/13560):
+
+```
+commit 20d86d9c63476b6312b87dc5b0e4aa4822eb7717
+Author: Andrew Kelley <andrew@ziglang.org>
+Date:   2022-11-13T01:35:20+02:00
+
+    add zig1.wasm.zst
+    
+    This commit adds a 637 KB binary file to the source repository. This
+    commit does nothing else, so it should be replaced with a different
+    commit before this branch is merged to avoid bloating the git
+    repository.
+
+ stage1/zig1.wasm.zst | Bin 0 -> 652012 bytes
+ 1 file changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
+```
+
+[Andrew's motivation][3] is legit from a Zig developer's perspective. However,
+checked-in binary blobs have trust issues, regardless of what we think about
+the author.
+
+The last commit that can[^1] be built without binary blobs is the parent of
+this one:
+
+```
+commit 28514476ef8c824c3d189d98f23d0f8d23e496ea
+Author: Andrew Kelley <andrew@ziglang.org>
+Date:   2022-11-01T05:29:55+02:00
+
+    remove `-fstage1` option
+
+    After this commit, the self-hosted compiler does not offer the option to
+    use stage1 as a backend anymore.
+```
+
+Once C++ implementation was removed, Zig is required to build Zig. This is a
+cyclic dependency, which Zig Core team breaks by continuously checking in *a*
+Zig implementation in wasm, the `zig1.wasm` file, which is used to build the
+compiler.
+
+Andrew suggests a motivated third-party to implement a [Zig
+interpreter][zig-interpreter] in non-zig that could break this chain. While
+that would be certainly be ideal, but nobody has built it yet 🤷.
+
+The steps to build "trusted"[^3] zig are roughly:
+
+1. Build zig from the C++ implementation of the commit above (with hacks and
+   tricks to make it [actually compile][4]).
+2. Use previous step to build the first Zig self-hosted.
+3. Proceed to the next step. When the updated zig does not build, find creative
+   ways to build it anyway (or, when really stuck, ask @mlugg).
+4. Goto 2 for [45+ times][5].
+
+After reaching `0.11.0-1894-gb92e30ff0b`, which is two `zig1.wasm` updates away
+from 0.12.0, I received an email from Hilton Chain, titled `Thank you for the
+work on bootstrapping Zig!`, where they took my PoC, [re-created all of it in
+Guix DSL][6] and ran all the way to 0.13.0[^2]. This made me flabbergasted.
+
+I audited their script to see if it really deletes `zig1.wasm` at every
+checkout, ran it to produce `zig1.wasm` of `0.13.0` myself. Once I had
+`zig1.wasm` of 0.13.0, I did the same as I did in the official `zig1.wasm`:
+built zig3, used it to build `zig1.wasm`, and voilà, the hashes of the official
+`zig1.wasm` and the one built by myself and Hilton match.
+
+I am looking forward to Hilton landing his Zig work to Guix, so anyone can
+audit the build script and reproduce this exercise by themselves with an
+otherwise  [bootstrappable][7] system.
+
+If anyone can trace origins of `zig1.wasm` and produce an identical version
+themselves, perhaps it's not too bad to have it checked in?
+
+[^1]: Not exactly. Some reverts and code movement is necessary. See the [`run`
+    script][5] for details.
+
+[^2]: Their work is on a branch in Guix repository, which has `zig` in the
+    title. I will not link it here, as it will be removed when it lands, but it
+    should be easy to find for determined readers before it does.
+
+[^3]: We trust no-one except ourselves.
+
+[1]: https://ultrarare.space/
+[2]: https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~rdriley/487/papers/Thompson_1984_ReflectionsonTrustingTrust.pdf
+[3]: https://ziglang.org/news/goodbye-cpp/
+[4]: https://ziggit.dev/t/building-self-hosted-from-the-original-c-implementation/6607?u=motiejus
+[5]: https://git.jakstys.lt/motiejus/zig-repro/src/commit/7f37da6e75cab9d4637b8173d713f91853c9ef54/run#L1032-L1076
+[6]: https://issues.guix.gnu.org/74217
+[7]: https://guix.gnu.org/en/blog/2023/the-full-source-bootstrap-building-from-source-all-the-way-down/
+
+[zig-interpreter]: https://ziggit.dev/t/building-self-hosted-from-the-original-c-implementation/6607/2?u=motiejus