jakstys.lt/content/log/2024/zig-reproduced-without-binaries.md

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---
title: "Zig Reproduced Without Binaries"
date: 2024-11-12T22:21:48+02:00
slug: zig-reproduced-without-binaries
---
I decided to bootstrap Zig without using binaries that are [checked in the
repository](https://github.com/ziglang/zig/blob/0.13.0/stage1/zig1.wasm) and
answer if the resulting `zig1.wasm` in the latest Zig release (0.13.0) is the
same the one bootstrapped without using those binaries.
TLDR: yes, they are the same:
```
$ sha256sum code/zig{,2}/stage1/zig1.wasm
127909fb8c9610ce3f296d8a48014546c0f85055115002fb3aba4d865dcdbb27 code/zig/stage1/zig1.wasm
127909fb8c9610ce3f296d8a48014546c0f85055115002fb3aba4d865dcdbb27 code/zig2/stage1/zig1.wasm
```
I can now confidently say (and you can also check, you don't need to [trust
me][2]) that there is nothing hiding in `zig1.wasm` that hasn't been
checked-in as a source file.
Many, many thanks to [Hilton Chain][1] for reasons I that will become clear
later. The rest of this post walks through how I arrived to this claim.
# Official zig1.wasm
Steps to acquire the official incarnation of `zig1.wasm` are straightforward:
download Zig, build `zig3` using the official instructions, use it to
`update-zig1`:
```
git clone https://github.com/ziglang/zig; cd zig
git checkout 0.13.0
mkdir build; pushd build
cmake ..
make -j$(nproc) install
popd
build/stage3/bin/zig build update-zig1
```
Which results in an updated `code/zig/stage1/zig1.wasm`:
```
$ git diff --stat
stage1/zig1.wasm | Bin 2675178 -> 2800926 bytes
1 file changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
```
We will be comparing this file to the one bootstrapped in the next section.
# Binary-free zig1.wasm
Building Zig 0.13.0 without binaries is tricky, because to build Zig 0.13.0, we
need a `zig1.wasm`, which has been checked in and continuously updated since
[late 2022](https://github.com/ziglang/zig/pull/13560):
```
commit 20d86d9c63476b6312b87dc5b0e4aa4822eb7717
Author: Andrew Kelley <andrew@ziglang.org>
Date: 2022-11-13T01:35:20+02:00
add zig1.wasm.zst
This commit adds a 637 KB binary file to the source repository. This
commit does nothing else, so it should be replaced with a different
commit before this branch is merged to avoid bloating the git
repository.
stage1/zig1.wasm.zst | Bin 0 -> 652012 bytes
1 file changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
```
[Andrew's motivation][3] is reasonable from a Zig developer's perspective.
However, checked-in binary blobs have trust issues, regardless of what we think
about the author.
The last commit that can[^1] be built without using binary blobs is the parent
of this one:
```
commit 28514476ef8c824c3d189d98f23d0f8d23e496ea
Author: Andrew Kelley <andrew@ziglang.org>
Date: 2022-11-01T05:29:55+02:00
remove `-fstage1` option
After this commit, the self-hosted compiler does not offer the option to
use stage1 as a backend anymore.
```
After this, Zig is required to build Zig. This is a cyclic dependency, which
Zig Core team breaks by continuously checking in *a* Zig compiler in
wasm, the `zig1.wasm` file, which is used to build the compiler.
Andrew suggests a motivated third-party to implement a [Zig
interpreter][zig-interpreter] in non-Zig that could break this chain. While
that would be certainly be ideal, nobody has built it yet 🤷.
The steps to build "trusted"[^3] Zig are roughly:
1. Build Zig from the C++ implementation of the commit above (with hacks and
tricks to make it [actually compile][4]).
2. Use previous step to build the first Zig self-hosted.
3. Proceed to the next step. When the updated Zig does not build, find creative
ways to build it anyway (or, when really stuck, ask @mlugg).
4. Goto 2 for [45+ times][5].
After reaching `0.11.0-1894-gb92e30ff0b`, which is two `zig1.wasm` updates away
from 0.12.0, I received an email from Hilton Chain, titled `Thank you for the
work on bootstrapping Zig!`, where they took my PoC, [re-created all of it in
Guix DSL][6] and ran all the way to 0.13.0[^2]. This made me flabbergasted.
I audited their script to see if it really deletes `zig1.wasm` at every
checkout, ran it to produce `zig1.wasm` of `0.13.0` myself:
```
$ ./pre-inst-env guix build zig@0.13
< ... a few hours ... >
/gnu/store/mz95707dd7qmycpr1f0ndxhkmx3vdy1c-zig-0.13.0
/gnu/store/kqwq8sjgwi561sp78vfi6xkgm9i3wysk-zig-0.13.0-zig1
$ ls -l /gnu/store/kqwq8sjgwi561sp78vfi6xkgm9i3wysk-zig-0.13.0-zig1/bin/zig1.wasm
-r--r--r-- 5 root root 2661492 Jan 1 1970 /gnu/store/kqwq8sjgwi561sp78vfi6xkgm9i3wysk-zig-0.13.0-zig1/bin/zig1.wasm
```
Once I had `zig1.wasm` of 0.13.0, I did the same as I did in the official
`zig1.wasm`: built `zig3`, used it to build `zig1.wasm`, and voilà, the hashes of
the official `zig1.wasm` and the one built here match.
# Conclusions and open questions
I am looking forward to Hilton landing this to Guix, so anyone can audit the
build script and reproduce this exercise by themselves with an otherwise
[bootstrappable][7] system. If you don't trust Guix, what and whom do you
trust?
If anyone can trace origins of `zig1.wasm` by producing an identical version
themselves, perhaps it's not too bad to trust it and have it checked in?
[^1]: Not exactly. Some reverts and code movement is necessary. See the [`run`
script][5] for details.
[^2]: Their work is on a branch in Guix repository, which has `zig` in the
title. I will not link it here, as it will be removed when it lands, but it
should be easy to find for determined readers before it does.
[^3]: We trust no-one except ourselves and our little machine on our desk.
[1]: https://ultrarare.space/
[2]: https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~rdriley/487/papers/Thompson_1984_ReflectionsonTrustingTrust.pdf
[3]: https://ziglang.org/news/goodbye-cpp/
[4]: https://ziggit.dev/t/building-self-hosted-from-the-original-c-implementation/6607?u=motiejus
[5]: https://git.jakstys.lt/motiejus/zig-repro/src/commit/7f37da6e75cab9d4637b8173d713f91853c9ef54/run#L1032-L1076
[6]: https://issues.guix.gnu.org/74217
[7]: https://guix.gnu.org/en/blog/2023/the-full-source-bootstrap-building-from-source-all-the-way-down/
[zig-interpreter]: https://ziggit.dev/t/building-self-hosted-from-the-original-c-implementation/6607/2?u=motiejus